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Policy-makers at the federal and state levels are exploring
alternative cost-effective approaches for water quality regulation,
particularly options for controlling non-point sources. While
questions abound over the appropriate means for controlling non-
point sources, there is good reason to focus on regulatory options
for controlling irrigation return flows because they can be•
addressed through farm-level water management and technological
improvements. Whatever the regulatory approach or management
level, an essential aspect of any program to regulate agricultural
return flows is assigning responsibility for pollution control to
the polluters. This need for accountability can be satisfied with
the designation of an intermediate, regional entity -- a regional
drainage district -- to coordinate the operation of the program
and the activities of individual farmers to meet requirements of
the regulatory agency. A regional entity also would be well-
positioned to identify and respond to needs for regional services
or activities to accomplish water quality objectives.
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A. Overview of the Problem
1. Twenty years of water quality regulation under the CwA have
resulted in some significant improvements in surface water quality,
primarily through regulation of municipal and industrial point
source discharges. These gains have not come cheaply; EPA
estimates that the total costs of water pollution control by 1990
were $42.4 billion (in 1986 dollars annualized at 7 percent)(cited
in Frederick,p.1). Yet, there are still a great many surface water
bodies in the United States that do not support designated uses.
Because non-point sources are the principal contributors of
nutrients and toxics, there is increasing concern that additional
investments in technology-based point-source controls will not
produce commensurate gains in water quality.
2. Policy-makers at the federal and state levels are exploring
alternative cost-effective approaches for water quality regulation,
particularly options for controlling non-point sources. By nature,
non-point sources are diffuse and variable, emanating from a large
number of independent sources and land-use activities, and thus
tend to be difficult to control. Agricultural runoff is the single
largest contributor to non-point source pollution, including
nutrient loadings, siltation, sediments, pesticides, toxics and
salinity. Options for controlling many of these different types
Of agricultural runoff are limited, requiring changes in land use
patterns and practices.
3. However, irrigation return flows, which transport pesticides,
toxic trace elements, salts and other constituents are one subset
of agricultural runoff more conducive to regulation. Unlike other
types of agricultural activity, irrigation often involves the use
of surface, and subsurface, drains and ditches to collect and
convey drainage (i.e., surface and subsurface return flows) to a
paint of disposal or recycling. Second, irrigation return flows
are a direct function of water application and water use efficiency
both of which can be measured. Thus, irrigation return flows can
be addressed through farm-level water management and technological
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improvements. In short, while questions abound over the
appropriate means for controlling non-point sources generally,
there is good reason to focus on regulatory options and management
measures for controlling irrigation return flows.
B. ReaulatorY Options
1. In policy debates, and academic literature, attention is being
given to the appropriate control mechanisms for irrigation return
flows. The tendency is to follow the same approach used for point
sources; namely uniform technology standards in the form of Best
Management Practices (BMPs). However, there is growing interest in
incentive-based approaches, such as effluent fees, input pricing,
tradable discharge permits, that have the potential to be more
cost-effective than BMPs in controlling irrigation return flows
because they allow cost-sharing and flexibility through
decentralized decision-making.
2. A second issue of debate is the appropriate level of
management for non-point source regulation; i.e., site-specific
management plans or basin-wide water quality plans.
C. The Role of a Regional Entity in Reaulatina Irrigation Return
Flows 
1. Whatever the regulatory approach or management level, an
essential aspect of any program to regulate agricultural return
flows is assigning responsibility for pollution control to the
polluters.
2. In establishing this accountability, a regulatory system has
to make sense from the perspective of the regulated community as
well as the regulators. It has to balance the need for centralized
authority at the state or regional level to ensure compliance with
the efficacy of decentralized, site-specific planning and
management.
(a) From the perspective of the regulator, the system should
be efficient, with managable administrative requirements to ensure
compliance with water quality standards or other environmental
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objectives. In the case of irrigated agriculture, the regulatory
agencies are better off with as few regulated entities to
administer and monitor as possible. The traditional approach of
issuing individual discharge permits to farmers is a daunting
regulatory prospect. Similarly, verifying BMPs on individual farms
poses a significant burden.
(b) The regulated agricultural community will be more likely
to comply with a program that ensures maximum flexibility to take
account of farm-level environmental and economic conditions in
achieving pollution control objectives. Farmers also have come to
enjoy a tradition of independence and autonomy relative to other
regulated industries, and are more likely to accept regulatory
approaches which work through existing or familiar institutions
that they control (i.e., water districts).
(c) The design of the regulatory approach also should take
into account the nature of the pollution problem to be solved. For
example, irrigation return flows are not confined to the boundaries
of a given farm or water district. In some cases, farms without
drains or other collection systems contribute to the regional water
table or to subsurface drainage on neighboring farms (through
lateral migration). In other cases, the effective management of
return flows may depend on regional collection and control of
return flows. In these situations, the regulatory system should
accommodate the regional nature of pollution problems due to the
non-exclusive nature of drainage flows and high groundwater tables.
3. In this context, a key component in any program to control
irrigation return flows is the creation or designation of an
intermediate, regional entity as an accountable "link" to
coordinate the operation of the program and the activities of
individual farmers with the requirements of the regulatory agency.
A regional entity also would be well-positioned to identify and
respond to needs for regional services or activities to accomplish
program goal.
III. AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE GRASSLANDS SUBBASIN
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A. Drainaae Related Problems in the Grasslands
1. Drainage from irrigated agriculture poses one of the most
significant environmental problems in the San Joaquin Valley today.
On the westside, toxic trace elements (notably selenium, boron,
arsenic, molybdenum) and salts occur naturally in the soils, and
are mobilized and transported in the subsurface drainage water as
a result of irrigation.
2. The Grasslands region of the San Joaquin River Basin faces
formidable drainage problems. In the past, drainage management
practices in this 92,000 acre area largely consisted of
agricultural districts and individual farmers relying on discharge
to the San Joaquin River via various man-made and natural channels
as the preferred method of drainage management.
3. This practice has resulted in severe degradation not only to
local riparian and river habitats, but also to the extensive and
valuable regional wetlands.
B. $olution to the Problem is Known
1. The solution to this problem lies in improved irrigation
management at the individual farm level, combined with limited
operational changes at the water district level. The efficacy of
this approach has been acknowledged by a broad range of interests
and experts, and is the cornerstone of the recommendations which
emerged from the eight-year, $50 million Federal-State San Joaquin
Valley Drainage Program (SJVDP) and the California Technical
Committee which preceded it. Some improvement has already occurred
concurrent with curtailed water deliveries during the recent
drought.
2. Specific drainage management practices have been identified
which can control drainage generation at the source, including
measures to: improve management of irrigation systems
(e.g.,irrigation scheduling); improve present irrigation practices
(e.g., shortening of furrows, use of tailwater return systems) and
adopting new irrigation methods. These measures assume the use of
existing technology and represent the lowest cost drainage
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management method available to growers.
C. Regulatory Context
1. California has adopted numerical water quality standards which
are not being met in Central Valley streams because of the
discharges of subsurface drainage water from agricultural
operations. Under state law (unlike federal law), the State Water
Resources Control Board has the authority to regulate irrigated
agriculture under a permit system.
2. The state has adopted an implementation plan for achieving
water quality objectives which includes three basic enforcement
options: voluntary measures, regional mangement practices,
discharge permits. However, the current voluntary program lacks
a meaningful mechanism for assessing compliance by individual
farmers or water districts, sidesteps the issue of enforcement, and
appears unlikely to be successful in meeting water quality
standards.
3. At the federal level, the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments
require states to target critical areas for non-point source
control and are encouraged to adopt appropriate BHPs to address
those problems (section 319).
4. Water districts have general authority to provide drainage
services but lack the incentive and clear legal mandate to play a
decisive role.
5. The regulatory tools and institutions for reducing
agricultural drainage pollution in the Grasslands are in place.
EDF is investigating the feasibility of using a system of tradable
discharge permits. The allowable pollution load would be assigned
to a regional drainage district, which in turn would have authority
over existing water districts that coordinate and finance water and
drainage management programs and facilities at the farm- and
district-levels.




1. At a minimum, a regional drainage district should have powers
and capabilities necessary to: operate and manage drainage
facilities and discharges at a regional level; regulate and enforce
drainage management practices as the entity "accountable" to state
or local regulatory agencies; oversee a system of exchanges among
holders of discharge allowances (districts or farmers), and perhaps
act as a "market maker" (a broker) of pollution allowances; monitor
and evaluate irrigation practices, drainage management and disposal
in the region; provide technical and/or financial assistance to
farmers in defining and meeting drainage management objectives;
coordinate activities and management with water delivery schedules
and constraints of the Bureau of Reclamation, and the requirements
of other agencies; levy fees or assessments to enforce regional
objectives or to construct and operate regional drainage
facilities; impose sanctions (including restrictions on water use,
tiered water pricing, effluent fees); contract with other local,
state or federal entities.
B. Relationship to Existing Entities 
1. There are 14 water districts and other types of agencies that
supply water to farmers within the Grasslands subbasin. In
addition, there are six drainage districts, which provide drainage
services to their members. Several of the agencies both supply
water to and provide drainage for their members.
2. Each of these existing agencies would be members of the
regional drainage district and would receive allowances that would
quantify their respective legal entitlements to discharge
pollutants regulated by state and Federal law.
V. ROLE OF THE REGIONAL DRAINAGE DISTRICT IN WATER OUALITY
MANAGEMENT
A. Purpose
1. The state, through the regional water quality authority, has
authority to set loading objectives consistent with water quality
standards. The regional drainage district would be responsible to
the state ! agency for compliance with the aggregate pollution
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discharge limits for the Grasslands subbasin. In turn, the regional
drainage district would allocate pollution allowance to each of its
member agencies and would have authority to monitor and enforce
(i.e., impose sanctions) the loading limitations established by the
allowances.
B. Membership
1. The regional drainage district would be comprised of existing
water and drainage entities and individual farmers within the
Grasslands subbasin.
C. Implementatios
1. Each member agency would be responsible for complying with the
pollution limits set forth in its allowance. The means of achieving
required loading reductions would be determined by the member
agency in conjunction with member farmers. For example, the
required reduction could be met by reductions in applied water,
changes in crop patterns, treatment, or acquisition of additional
allowances from other participating agencies (i.e., members could
transfer allowances to other agencies to enable the





1. The success of a tradable permit system, or any regulatory
approach, requires unambiguous lines of authority regarding the
legal status of the regulatory instruments, regional-level
reporting and enforcement responsibility, and farm-level
accountability.
2. In the Grasslands, this need for accountability is best
satisfied at the regional level through a regional entity (e.g.,
Regional Drainage District, independent third party, a joint powers
authority, or a local authority) with authority to oversee,
facilitate, and help enforce a regulatory system (including
tradable discharge permits) among water districts, taking into
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account the role and jurisdiction of existing agencies in the
Grasslands region.
(a) The regional drainage district satisfies regulatory
concerns over ease of administration and minimizes the "information
burden" associated with mandating specific technological controls
and management practices for individual dischargers. This should
increase the effectiveness of the state r s water quality enforcement
because a single regional entity would be accountable to the
regulatory agency rather than 20 separate entities under the
current system. Member districts would have the incentive to pass
responsibility for pollution control on to their individual
farmers.
(b) The concerns of the regulated community about flexibility
and autonomy are satisfied by leaving intact the existing
relationships between water districts and member farmers who
control the districts and have information to determine the most
appropriate pollution control measures.
(c) The regional drainage district enables a watershed or
basin-wide approach consistent with environmental and operational
boundaries of the pollution problem.
(d) The proposed regional drainage district provides a
template for the formation, authorization and incorporation of a
regional entity to serve as a blueprint for other agricultural
regions.
3. While water quality and water supplies typically are managed
separately -- through different institutions, according to
different legal and administrative procedures-- issues of quality
and supply are intimately related. In the water quality arena, a
regional entity with authority and accountability for controlling
irrigation return flows could make explicit the potential for
addressing agriculture-induced water quality problems through water
(supply) application and management.
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